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THE CONCEPT OF INCOME IN FEDERAL TAXATION
By
HE

HENRY ROTTSCEAEFER*

economist's aim in defining "income" is that of devel-

oping a working tool adapted to economic analysis. The
task confronting a court charged with the burden of defining it
is generally, as far as its legal character is concerned, that of
discovering what some person or group other than the judges
themselves intended it to mean. The judicial determinations of
what constitutes income as between life-tenant and remainderman, and what is income within the sixteenth amendment, have
at least that formal characteristic in common.' The element of
fiction usually present in this judicial process is enhanced when
applied to a constitutional amendment in whose adoption many
and widely scattered groups have participated. It was almost certain that the intention that would emerge in the process of construing the sixteenth amendment would be as much the product
of judicial creation as the record of a discovered fact.2 It was
to be expected that economic analysis would enter into the process,
but at the same time that it would not be the sole factor in it.
The very fact that courts had already prior to the adoption of
the sixteenth amendment determined the character of stock dividends as income or capital would be relevant to the legal problem presented by Eisner v. Maconber, but have practically no significance for the economist. The refinements of economic anal*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189. 64
L. Ed. 521. See for discussion of this problem, E. H. Warren, Taxability of Stock Dividends as Income, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 885: E. Seligman, Implications of the Stock Dividend Decision, 21 Col. L. Rev.
313; T. R. Powell, Stock 'Dividends, Direct Taxes, and the Sixteenth
Amendment, 20 Col. L. Rev. 536.
-This is true of both the prevailinz and dissenting opinions in
Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S. 189. 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed.
521.
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ysis frequently transcend the needs involved in the problem betoure
the courts, and might even interfere with the practical purposes
ot income taxation. The treatment of the question whether savings constitute income furnishes an example. There are, theretore, reasons why the legal theory of income for income tax
purposes cannot be expected to conform exactly to any of the
various theories advanced by economifts," but the character of
the problem makes it desirable to take these latter at least as
points of departure in developing the former. However much
the economists' views may lack that definiteness that is essential
to exact classification of situations into those that do, and that
do not, involve income, they do represent the views of those best
qualified to deal with such questions. Resort to the economists'
theories in evaluating the legal theory is, therefore, legitimate,
particularly in so far as the courts have supported their theory
by economic analysis.4 The subsequent discussion will proceed
on that assumption.
The economist frequently finds it desirable to distinguish
between social and individual income. A government that taxes
income is mainly interested in how much income particular taxpayers receive during a given tax period regardless of whether
the amount received by anyone of them involves a concurrent
addition to social income or a mere redistribution of the social
income accrued during the same or a previous tax period. The
distribution to stockholders by a going concern during a given
period of the net corporate earnings for the same period represents a mere redistribution of what had already become part of
the social income, and the same is equally true of such corporate
distributions from the net earnings of prior tax periods. The
various federal income tax acts have treated such redistributions
as involving the receipt of income by the stockholders, and it
has been held that the sixteenth amendment does not prevent this
result even where the distribution is from the net earnings accumulated by the corporation prior to its adoption.5 This does not
3See W W Hewett, The Definition of Income and Its Apntication
in Federal Taxation R. M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic
and 4Legal Aspects, in R. M. Haig, The Federal Income Tax.
See R. M. Haig, The Federal Income Tax; J. Learned Hand in
Fraser v Comm. of Int. Rev.. (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1928) 25 F (2d) 653.
5
Lynch v. Hornby (1918) 247 U. S. 339. 38 Sup. Ct. 543, 62 L.
Ed. 1149. Dividends from pre March 1. 1913, surplus are no longer
taxable, but, since such tax-free distributions reduce the loss and gain
base on disposing of the-stock, the effect of the ehanfie has been
merely to defer the time when they affect the stockholder's income.
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mean that every receipt by a particular taxpayer after February
28, 1913, could validly be treated as income, but only that the
reason for its exclusion must be found in some other ground
than that it involves a mere redistribution of what had already
entered the aggregate social wealth through the door of income.
The sixteenth amendment, therefore, permits Congress to adopt
the individual, as distinct from the social income concept, although
it undoubtedly also allows it to define income so as to reflect
considerations derived from the latter theory which is in effect
what happens when gifts received are excluded from gross income,
whatever may have been the motive or purpose of that statutory
provision. The tax Acts have been construed as embodying an
individual income concept. 6 One further preliminary remains.
Economists have urged some very cogent objections to a money
income concept because of the many situations in which money
income varies from real income. The exigencies of taxation,
however, make it easily the most practical conception, and the
income tax definitions have embodied it to the practical exclusion
of every other type of income concept. This does not mean that
receipts of money alone are income, but that, regardless of the
form in which income is received, it enters into the account with
the government in the amount of its monetary equivalent. The argument in the prevailing opimon in Eisner v. Macmnber that nothing more clearly demonstrated the capital nature of stock dividends than that it would require a conversion of capital to pay
the tax seems predicated on the view that nothing is income unless
available for payment of the tax in the form in which received.
Since in general taxes have to be paid in money, this would indicate the adoption of a quite naive money income concept. The
later cases holding dividends paid in debentures of the paying
company, 7 or in stock of- other companies," to be income, show
clearly that the courts have not accepted the full implications of
that theory
It would, therefore, be unwarranted to conclude
that the sixteenth amendment required income to be construed in
See article by T. R. Powell, Income and Corporate Dividends, 35 Harv.
L. Rev.
363.
6
United States v. Phellis, (1921) 257 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 63.
66 L. Ed. 180.
'Doerschuk v. United States. (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 739.
sUnited States v. Phellis. (1921) 257 U. S. 156, 42 Sun. Ct. 63.
66 L. Ed. 180; Cullinan v. Walker, (1923) 262 U. S. 134. 43 Sun. Ct.
495, 67 L. Ed. 906; Marr v. United States, (1925) 268 U. S. 536. 45
Sup. Ct. 575, 69 L. Ed. 1079.
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terms of the money income concept, it is quite unlikely that any

other theory will ever be acted on, although the real income theory
might well secure a more equitable distribution of the tax burden
especially so far as capital gains enter into taxable income.
Courts and economists are agreed that income denotes a low
of something 9 during a period of time as distinct from a static
situation as of a particular instant of time. There is considerable
controversy among economists whether that "something" is coinprised of usances, services, goods, or the money value of these.
The adoption of the money income concept by our tax laws commits them to the last of these alternatives. The legal theory of
income thus has reference to the money value of the flow of
goods and services accruing to a person during a given period
of time. 10 It is apparent from experience that the receipt of
something of value by a given person frequently involves a prior
outlay of other things of value by him. The question, therefore,
arises whether the constitutional theory of income reqires the
latter fact to be taken into account in determining such person's
income in respect of that receipt. The statutory definitions have
invariably recognized this factor in their provisions as to deductions from gross income. The 1913 Act, however, limited the depletion deduction in the case of mines in such manner as to result ii
some cases in the inclusion in the taxable net income of part of
the capital value of the product of the mine. This was attacked
on the ground that it produced to that extent a tax on capital as
such. thus involving an unapportioned direct tax. The decision
denied that the method involved a violation of the sixteenith
amendment, but the reasoning of the opinion leaves the ultiiialc
basis for the holding shrouded in almost impenetrable obscurity "
In a later case a corporation had a favorable contract for the purchase of its raw materials which had an admitted value at March
1, 1913, of X dollars. The court construed the 1916 Act as not
permitting the deduction of the exhaustion of its value due to
lapse of time. The taxpayer's contention that this would be invalid
as a direct tax on capital was answered with the argument thaf
9
What that something is, is a matter of dispute among economists.
The law has, as indicated, treated it as meaning the money value of
goods and services.
' 0 The definition is made to include services to take care of such
cases as those in which a person receives a salary paid in money plus
living quarters; see, e.g., Reg. 69, Art. 33.
"'Stanton v Baltic Mining Co., (1916) 240 I S. 103. 36 Sup. Ct.
278. 60 L. Ed. 546.
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"under the sixteenth amendment the Congress had the power to
require the payment of the tax without allowing any deductiu
for the purpose of returning to the taxpayer his entire invested
capital at the expiration of the life of the property trom which
the income was derived.""' The decisions warrant the inference
that a gross income concept accords with the meaning of "income"
in the sixteenth amendment, differing in this respect from the
most generally accepted definitions of the economists. The court
in is opinion in the last cited case, however, stated that "if any
part of the income
had been the result of a sale by the
plaintiff to another of an interest in the contract itself, a different question would be presented."
This intimation merely
reflected the emphasis on "gain" as an element in income in
Eisner v. Maco-nber and Goodrich v. Edwards. The definition
of income in Eisner v..4 acomber states, among other things, that
it is "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined."' 3 In Goodrich v. Edwards" the Supreme Court
approved the government's act in confessing that there was no
taxable gain in the case of a sale of a capital asset, acquired prior
to March 1, 1913, if sold at less than its cost although for more
than its March 1, 1913 value. The opinion shows clearly that
the Court itself would have so held had it been called upon to
decide that issue, its reasons were that the statute taxed gains
only, that the definition of income approved by the Court in the
Maconber Case stressed gain as an element in income, and that
there was no gain where the selling price was less than original
cost. The case involved only a construction of the 1916 \ct,
but, in view of the part played by the definition of income in
Eisner v.Macomber in the Court's ascertainment of the meaning
of "gain," there exist grounds for believing that the Court
adopted its definition of "gain" as one demanded by its theory
of income enunciated in the Macazber Case. That theory was
not formulated for any particular fact situation, but has all the
appearances of being intended as one of general applicability If
"gain" in the definition in Eisner v. Macomber has the meaning
given it in Goodrich v. Edwards, as can with justice be argued
for the reasons just stated, then the sixteenth amendment embodies
12Ky. Tobacco Products Co. v. Lucas, (D.C. Ky. 1925)
5 F
(2d) 3723.
1 Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189.
64 L. Ed. 521.

14(1921) 255 U. S. 527 41 Sup. Ct. 390, 65 L. Ed. 758.
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a net income concept. In any event, it the view of Goodrich v
lidwards above stated be adopted, income in the amendment
emerges as a net income concept as applied to sales of capital
assets other than those gradual dispositions thereof that are a
normal incident of any business employing capital and which arc
supposed to be cared for through depreciation or depletion. The
authorities, therefore, do not warrant a definitive answer to the
questions whether the sixteenth amendment permits the adoption
of a gross income concept or requires the adoption of a net income
concept, the most that can be said is that they have permitted
the former in certain situations, and justify the view that they
require the latter in certain other situations. This is a rather
unfortunate state of affairs since no tests have been judicially
developed to determine into which category any particular situation
will be put.15
The accepted definition of income as used in the sixteenth
amendment stresses gain as an element therein. The idea that
naturally suggests itself when the term "gain" is used in connection with economic matters is that of an increase in wealth. It
might seem, therefore, that no transaction would produce taxable
income unless its effect involved an increase in wealth to the particular person chargeable therewith for tax purposes. It should be
stated that the question here is not whether the particular act on
whose occurrence the law makes the existence of income dependent
itself produces an increase in the taxpayer's wealth, but rather
whether it terminates a process that has involved that result. The receipt of a salary at the end of a month, for instance, does not itself
increase the recipient's wealth, it does, however, furnish a convenient moment for treating as a completed unit the process by
which the recipient was increasing his wealth during such month.
There are indications that this consideration sometimes influences
courts to decide that particular transactions produce no income.
In one case a railroad company had leased its road to an operating lessee under a lease that required the lessee to pay all taxes
assessed on the lessor's income. The government assessed an
additional tax on the lessor on the amount of the federal income
tax paid for it by the lessee. It was held that the 1916 Act did
not warrant that tax.1 6 The reason that was deemed conclusive
15The statutory definitions of the taxable quantity have in general
followed the lines of a net income concept, and one in sonic respects
even more favorable to the taxpayer.
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against the government's contention was that the transaction
involved no gain for the lessor and that the definition ot income
in Eisner v. Maconber used the word "'ain." The court's conception of gain appears from the statement that the lessor "is
not made richer by the tax. Its financial situation is the sane
as when no income tax is laid, and continues the same however
high the rate of such taxation may become." Whatever may be
thought of the accuracy of this analysis, which takes no account
of what the lessor's financial condition would have been had it
itself paid said income tax, the theory that increase in the taxpayer's wealth is essential to the existence of income is here
clearly expressed. The same underlying theory is found in those
decisions that hold that an annuitant has no taxable income as
long as the sum of the annual payments received is less than the
consideration paid for the annuity 7 These decisions did not
directly determine that increase in the taxpayer's wealth is a constitutional requisite to the existence of income, but some at least
rely upon the definition in Ei ncr v Macomber in support of their
view. Goodrich v. Edwards affords another instance in which
increase in wealth accruing to the person charged with the acquisition of income is deemed essential to the existence of income.
There are, however, decisions that point to a contrary conclusion. Lynch v. Hornbyi8 involved the validity of the inclusion in a stockholder's income of dividends received after the
adoption of the sixteenth amendment but paid out of corporate
surplus accumulated from earnings prior thereto. The facts of
the case make it certain that these accumulations occurred during the period of the stockholder's ownership of his shares. His
wealth had, therefore, increased by at least the amount of the
taxed dividends during the period of his ownership, an increase
reflected in the March 1, 1913 value of his stock. The case
decided that the return to him of a part of that capital value in
the form of dividends paid by a going concern could be treated as
the receipt by him of income within the meaning of the sixteenth
amendment. It does not decide that the stockholder would or
cou!d have been taxed with the receipt of said dividends had he
l6Boston & lie. R. v. United States, (D.S. Mass. 1927) 23 F
(2d) 7343.
1 United States v. Bolster, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1928) 26 F (2d) 760;
Allen v. Brandeis, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 29 F (2d) 363; Warner V.
Walsh, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1926) 15 F (2d) 367
18(1918) 247 U. S.339, 38 Sup. Ct. 543, 62 L. Ed. 1149.
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purchased his shares the day before the declaration of the dividend
at a price which would normally have included the value of the
surplus adhering to his shares. It defines dividends as "one kind
of gain to the individual stockholder" in the form of the "recurrent returns upon his stock." That it intended by its use of the
term "gain" to restrict dividends to cases in which they involved
the realization of a real increase in wealth for the stockholder
seems doubtful since no point is made of the fact that the divicdend involved in the case represented the realization of such an
increase. That it would have held the dividend taxable in any
event seems evident from its statement that
"We do not overlook the fact that every distribution diminishes by just so much the assets of the corporation, and in a
theoretical sense reduces the intrinsic value of the stock."
The conclusion is not wholly certain since the Court immediately
attempts to establish a probable gain in the value of the shares
due to the payment of dividends, and further because the Court
may have had in mind only that the act of receiving the dividend might involve no increase in wealth for the stockholder
without committing itself on whether what was received must
involve a realized increase in wealth to the stockholder if it is
to be treated as a taxable dividend. However, the Court's final
statement that "Congress laid hold of dividends paid in the
ordinary course as de facto income of the stockholder, without
regard to the ultimate effect upon the corporation resulting from
their payment" seems rather to indicate a view that the taxability
of dividends is independent of refined analysis of their effects
upon the financial position of the individual stockholder. The
practice is to include dividends in income regardless of whether
the stockholder has paid a price for his stock that included the
value of the surplus distributed by the dividend received, a position which is justified by the language in United States 'v. Phellis,
heretofore cited, that such stockholder "necessarily took subject
to the burden of the income tax proper to be assessed against
him by reason of the dividend if and when made." that he "stepped
in the shoes" of his vendor, and that "presumably the prospect
of a dividend influenced the price paid, and was discounted by
the prospect of an income tax to be paid thereon." The implications of Stanton v Baltic Mimng Co.,' 9 certainly negative the
t9
Stanton v Baltic Mining Co., (1916)
Ct. 278. 60 L. Ed. 546.

240 U. S. 103. 36 Sup.
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necessity of an increase in the taxpayer's wealth for the existence
of income in the constitutional sense. The Supreme Court furthermore stated in Taft v. Bowers-0 that
"There is nothing in the constitution which lends support
to the theory that gain actually resulting from increased vatue
of capital can be treated as taxable income in the hands of the
recipient only so far as the increase occurred while he owned the
property"
The net result is that increase in the taxpayer's wealth is in some
connections a requisite to the existence of, and a limit on the
amount of taxable income, and in other situations a factor in
neither. It is, however, certain that the absence of gain to the
taxpayer in a given transaction will influence courts to find no
income from it wherever the statutes permit such a construction.
Such doubts as surround the question whether there can
be income to a taxpayer unless there has been a prior or concurrent increase in his wealth are not shared by the problem of
whether there can be an increase in his wealth that is not income to him. The Stock Dividend case specifically stated that a
"gain accruing to capital," a "growth or increment of value in the
investment" is not income. The further fact required to make
it income is its realization, but once that occurs it becomes income. 21 That is a constitutional requirement before any acquisition can enter into the account between the government and
the taxpayer regardless of whether it closes a transaction involving gain to the taxpayer or one that does not involve his enrichment. The result has been to make the problem of what constitutes realization an important one in connection with the income
tax theory of income. The problem is to define those acts or
events on whose occurrence the law permits and requires a taxpayer to treat as terminated any particular economic process that
has entered into his economic activities. For example, the sale
in 1929 of securities acquired in 1928 is the act that terminates
the taxpayer's economic transaction of acquiring and holding
those securities, and the effect upon the vendor of the economic
forces bearing on that transaction during the entire period of
his ownership of those securities is taken into account by the
law only at the moment of sale. This does not mean that the
law assumes that that act itself is the -effective force responsible
-2°(1929) 49 Sup. Ct. 199.
1
-°
Merchants Loan & Tr. Co. v. Smietanka, (1921)
509, 41 Sup. Ct. 386, 65 L. Ed. 751.

Z55 U. S.
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for the existence of the income that the taxpayer is required to
return. It means only that the law requires the occurrence of
certain events before it treats those forces as having produced
those effects on the taxpayer which it deems essential to the acquisition of income by him. The result is that income is in some
instances assigned to an income period other than that in which
the forces responsible for its existence were operative in so far
as the tax year in which income is considered to have been realized may not include the whole of the period during which such
forces were operative. A sale in 1929 at a price in excess of
cost of acquisition in 1928 produces income for 1929 although
there was no increase in value during 1929 The necessity for
realization as an element in the constitutional theory of income,
therefore, negatives any notion that income is limited to changes
in a person's economic power occurring within the time period
in which the law requires it to be reported. It is this legal conception of realization that has next to be considered.
The starting point for any discussion of this problem is to
be found in the views stated in Eisner v Maco-mber The principal reason for holding stock dividends not to be income was
that their receipt involved no realization of anything. The Court's
view of the essentials of realization are found in that part of
its general discussion of income where income from property is
described as "a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value
proceeding from the property, severed from the capital, however
invested or employed, and coming in, being 'derived,' that is,
recezved or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit, and disposal, that is income derived from property Nothing else answers the description." This definition of
realization seems intended to fit all cases of receiving income
from property The requirement that the thing received must
have exchangeable value has received very little consideration in
the courts. Exchangeable value was identified with realizable
market value in a case in which no income was held to have
resulted to owners trom their transfer of their property to a
strictly family corporation;22 and the fact that certain securities
received in the course of a reorganization had a readily realizable
value was mcidentallv mentioned in United States v Phellis.2
It is the other requirements that have furnished the difficulties.
22
Bourn v. McLaughlin (D.C. Cal. 1927) 19 F (2d) 148.
23(1921) 257 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 63, 66 L. Ed. 180.
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A highly analytical view would indicate that two further conditions must exist before income from property can be deemed
to have been realized. (a) severance from the capital, and (b)
receipt by the taxpayer for his separate use. The cases in which
courts have employed the definition, however, have usually been
almost wholly concerned with the question whether the transactions dealt with involved any receipt by the taxpayer of something for his own separate use. The conclusion, when that
requirement is found to have been satisfied, is then sometimes
formulated in the statement that the taxpayer has derived income
from his capital investment.2 4 The conception of separation from
the capital is sometimes employed in the opinions to denote that
separation from the corporate assets that is required by the decisions for the existence of dividend income to the stockholder
and whose existence determines the conclusion that he has received
2
It is
a dividend, whether an ordinary or liquidating dividend.
in this sense only that the conception is used as an independent
factor in judicial reasomng on the problem of realization of
Its use as a test of the realization of
income from property
income from property has a limited scope, although its convenience
within those limits is undeniable and most of the cases in which
the courts have dealt with this problem of realization have involved
situations within those limits.26 Even here, however, separation
24
- See Doerschuk v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed.
739- United States v. Phellis, (1921) 257 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 63,
66 L. Ed. 180.
2 Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64
L Ed. 521, United States v. Phellis, (1921) 257 U. S. 156, 42 Sup.
Ct. 63, 66 L. Ed. 180; Michaels v. McLaughlin, (D.C. Cal. 1927) 20
F (2d)
26 959.
The theory underlying this conception of severance from capital
is that the realization of income by A requires the concurrent separation from the property of B of those assets whose acquisition constitutes A's income. There are, however, situations in which no one
would deny that A had received income from property in which there
is either no separation from the assets of another, or no such thing
in the usual sense of that oexpression. An example of the former
is the receipt by the owner of a farm of its annual produce which
he himself entirely consumes. An example of the latter is furnished
by the case of a producer who employs capital in his business and
who realizes his income therefrom parI passu with the sale of the
product; the purchaser's payment for the product does involve separating something from his assets; but in ordinary usage the producer is not for that reason described as realizing income bv its
separation from the purchaser's assets. The test in question is, however, a convenient one in those cases in which the recipient's pronertv
from which he derives income is invested in an enterprise not Ins
own; dividends, bond interest, and rent from leased premises furnish
examples.
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trom the capital and receipt by the recipient of something for
his separate use are closely united in judicial reasoning on the
problem of realization of income from property This is true in
Eisner v.Macomber and appears clearly in Doerschuk v United
States."; That case held that the payment to stockholders of
the corporation's own bonds constituted the receipt by them of
a dividend because they had "received an actual payment from
the profits which the company wished to distribute itsearnings
to the stockholders" and which did not invest the holder of tile
bond "with merely a different form of holding stock." The emphasis here is on the effect ot the transaction on the stockholder, the
reference to its effect on the corporation being quite incidental.
The problem of what constitutes the realization of income from
property can, therefore, be best considered by treating the requirements of severance from capital and receipt of something for the
recipient's separate use as intended to describe the saine acts
viewed from different angles. Since judicial discussion has emphasized the latter aspect, convenience of treatment will be
served bv adopting a like procedure.
The problem is to discover those facts that constitute the
receipt by the taxpayer of something of exchangeable value for
his separate use, benefit and disposal. It has been most discussed
in cases in which the question was whether a stockholder had
realized income from his investment in stock. The stockholder
had admittedly received something in every one of the cases to
be considered. The cases that raised the difficulties were those
in which that thing was some form of corporate security of either
the distributing corporation or a corporation that succeeded to
its assets in the course of a reorganization. In them the issue
was squarely raised as to whether the receipt of such security
involved the receipt of something for the recipient's separate use.
The security received was of course available for his separate
use, but in none of the cases was so nalve a conception even coiisidered. That security was invariably considered as a mere syibol, and the question was whether the thing represented thereby
had by the receipt of the symbol become available for the rectpient's separate use. The decision that a stock dividend involves
no realization of income for the stockholder is supported in part
by the statement that "it does not alter the pre-existing propor27(D.C. N.Y 1921) 274 Fed. 739.
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tionate interest of any stockholder." The payiment of its own
bonds to a corporation's stockholders is held to involve a realization of income by them although in substance each stockholder
has after that transaction the same proportionate interest in the
corporate assets as before.28 There are differences between these
two situations, but the question is whether those differences bear
on the point in issue. The whole interest of a stockholder after
a stock dividend is still an interest as a stockholder, and an interest in the whole pre-existing net corporate assets, while in the
second situation the stockholder's interest after receipt of the
bond is that of a stockholder in a part only of the pre-existing
net corporate assets and of a creditor in the balance thereof which
have thereby ceased to be a part of the net corporate assets. The
substantial similarity of the two transactions, as far as their
effects upon the maintenance of a pre-existing proportionality
among stockholders is concerned, appears clearly when it is
observed that an immediate liquidation after these transactions
would produce exactly identical distributions to the stockholders
who received the dividend stock or bonds, of the only pre-existing
assets to which they had any claim. In United States v. Phellis,
A Co. had organized B o. under the laws of a different state
from that of its own incorporation. It transferred all its assets
to the latter in exchange for some cash, all of the preferred stock
that B Co. issued, and all of B Co.'s common stock. The cash was
used to pay off a part of A Co.'s bonds, the preferred stock to
redeem the rest of its bonds and its preferred stock, the balance
being retained to cover its own common stock par for par, the
common stock was distributed to its stockholders. At the close
of the reorganization the net assets of B Co. available for its
common stockholders were less than the net assets of 4L. Co. available for its stockholders prior to the reorganization by the extent
of the preferred stock of B Co. retained by A Co. to cover its
own common stock par for par, but an equal amount of B Co.'s
assets were in substance reserved for those stockholders through
their ownership of A Co:'s common stock. Since the distribution
of the common stock of both companies at the completion of the
reorganization was the same as in A Co. before that time, the proportionality of the stockholders' interests in A Co.'s assets was,
if substance and not form be regarded, maintained for the same
group's interest in the same assets after their transfer to B Co.
2

sSee Doerschuk v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 739.
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The transaction, however, was held to have involved a realization of income for A Co.'s stockholders to the extent of the value
of the B Co. shares received by them. A similar analysis of the
facts in the other reorganization cases 20 would disclose the same
situation, but in all but one of them3" income was found to have
been realized. Furthermore, it is as true of these transactions
as of the distribution of a stock dividend that they do not "increase
the intrinsic value of his (the stockholder's) holding or of the
aggregate holdings of the other stockholders as they stood before." 3'
If, then, these cases are to be deemed consistent with
Eisner v. JVIacomber, the essence of realization will have to be
found in some feature other than the maintenance after the transaction of the same proportionate distribution of interests among
the same group of stockholders that existed before it, and other
than those mentioned in the quotation last set forth. The reasoning in these cases, particularly fully set forth in the Phellis Case,
throws some light on this matter.
The strongest argument urged by the taxpayer to support
the theory that the distribution in the Phellis Case involved no
realization of income was predicated on the theory that the old
and the reorganized corporations were substantially identical, and
that, therefore, there had been a mere distribution of certificates
indicating an increase in the value of the stockholder's capital
holdings. The Court's answer consists of an argument that is
principally concerned with proving that the two corporations were
not substantially identical. The facts relied on were that the plan
of reorganization contemplated a new corperation, that the reorganized corporation was organized under the laws of a different
state which "imported a different measure of responsibility to the
public, and presumably different rights between stockholders and
company and between stockholders inter sese than before," and
certain other facts of dubious relevancy Hence it was held the
new company must be treated as "a substantial corporate body
with its own separate identity, and its stockholders as having
"-United States v. Phellis, (1921) 257 U. S. 156. 42 Sup. Ct.
63, 66 L. Ed. 180; Rockefeller v. United States, (1921) 257 U. S.
176, 42 Sup. Ct. 68, 66 L. Ed. 186; Cullinan v. Walker, (1923) 262
U. S. 134, 43 Sup. Ct. 495, 67 L. Ed. 906; Marr v. United States, (1925)
268 U. S. 536, 45 Sup. Ct. 575, 69 L. Ed. 1079.
30
Weiss v. Stearn, (1924) 265 U. S. 242, 44 Sup. Ct. 490, 69 L.
Ed. 31
1001.
Eisner v. Macomber, (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64
L. Ed. 521.
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property rights and interests materially different from those incident to ownership of stock in the old company"
The result of
the distribution of the reorganized company's common stock,
therefore, transferred to the stockholders of the original company "new individual property rights
in realization of their
former contingent right to participate eventually in the accumulated surplus ;" this is a justified conclusion if the two corporations
are treated as separate entities as the Court did treat them. Substantially similar reasoning underlies the other reorganization
cases whose decisions accord with that in the Phellis Case, and
the theory of Weiss v. Steam is not in conflict therewith however
much its results may be irreconcilable with the other decisions.
In Mart v. United States, in which the question of Congress'
power to-tax such transaction was squarely discussed, the Court
expressly approved the government's contention that a stockholder
realized income not only when he acquired "an interest in a
different business enterprise or property" but also when he
acquired "an essentially different interest in the same business
enterprise or property." The result of these cases, therefore,
is that a stockholder realizes income from his investment in his
stock whenever his prior interest in the corporate assets, or some
part thereof, is after a transaction represented by an essentially
different interest therein than his interest therein before the transaction. The stock dividend decision rests in the final analysis
upon the theory that the stockholder's interest in the corporate
assets was essentially the same before and after that transaction.
The principle is equally applicable to ordinary dividends and liquidating dividends of the usual, type, m which the resulting transformation of the stockholder's interest in a part or. all of the corporate assets is clear ;32 it is only where these have been incidents
to reorganizations that controversies have arisen. It is patent,
therefore, that the crucial question is what differences justify the
conclusion that interests are essentially different. The difference
is clear enough when dividends are paid in cash, or when paid
by distributing part of the corporate assets in kind."3 The answer
32

See Langstaff v. Lucas, (D.C. Ky. 1925) 9 F (2d) 691. aff'd
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1926) 13 F (2d) 1022, certiorari denied, (1926) 273
U. S. 721, 47 Sup. Ct. 111, 71 L, Ed. 858, for discussion of the question as applied to liquidating dividends. The case of Cullinan v.
Walker, (1923) 262 U. S. 134, 43 Sup. Ct. 495, 67 L. Ed. 906, also
involved
a liquidating dividend.
3
3Peabody v. Eisner, (1918) 247 U. S. 347, 38 Sup. Ct. 546. 62
L. Ed. 1152, furnishes an instance of an ordinary dividend of this
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is note quite as easy where the stockholder receives the distributing corporation's own bonds, although the decision in Doerschuk
v. Umted States34 is justified since the stockholder by such transaction became a creditor with respect to assets in which his former interest was that of a stockholder's interest in surplus, and
the difference in legal nature between these involves a real difference in economic interest as well. The differences relied on
in the reorganization cases were of rather a technical legal nature.
That they may have involved parallel changes in the economic nature of the stockholder's interest is probable if that term be given a
rather broad scope, that such incidental economic changes were important is doubtful except in Cidlinan v kValkcrl and Weiss v
Stearn.36
That the Court did not expressly measure the significance ot
those changes by economic considerations is clear, in fact it
found no realization of income in Weiss v. Stearn in which,
taking a stockholder's entire interest in the old company as a
unit, the economic changes were the most pronounced. Furthermore, the adoption of the definition of realization of income by
a stockholder that emerges from the reorganization cases rcconciles
their decision with that of Eisner v Macomber only by defining
the test of the existence of essential differences in interests iii
terms that exclude at least some significant legal and economic
changes in interest. A share of stock represents an interest in
the corporate net assets. If the corporation has a surplus, the
share represents one kind of interest in that fraction of the net
assets that offsets the capital stock, and another kind of interest
in that part thereof that offsets the surplus, the difference in
the legal nature of his interests in these respective parts is generally
recognized, and the importance of the parallel economic differences is at least as great as in the cases in which realization was
found to exist. A stock dividend transforms the one interest
into the other, and therefore does involve the stockholder's acquisition of a different interest in the same enterprise or property, the
decision of Eisner v Macomber shows, however, that the difference is not an "essential" difference. It is not intended to convey
character, Langstaff v. Lucas, (D.C. Ky 1925) 9 F (2d) 691, aff'd
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1926) 13 F (2d) 1022, of a liquidating dividend of
that type.
34(D.C. N.Y 1921) 274 Fed. 739 (1921).
35(1923) 262 U. S. 134, 43 Sup. Ct. 495, 67 L. Ed. 906.
36(1924) 265 U. S. 242, 44 Sup. Ct. 490, 68 L. Ed. 1001.
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the idea that the transformation in interest last mentioned should
have received recognition by treating stock dividends as income,
but only to indicate that the decisive factor should be the nature
of the transformation. The Court did point out in Eisner v.
Macomber that the transformation there effected resulted in the
permanent capitalization of what had formerly been free surplus,
a consideration that may well justify that decision, but it did not
adequately dispose of the argument for a similar treatment of
the transformations in interest involved in the reorganization
cases. These cases, therefore, show that a stockholder realizes
income, that is, receives something for his separate use, whenever
the transaction results in his acquisition of an essentially different interest in what were the corporate assets before the transaction than the interest he had therein before it, and that no satisfactory generalization is possible as to what constitute essential
differences.73
The objection urged by the taxpayers in the cases just considered was that a transaction had realized no income for them
because they had nothing different from what they had before,
and, therefore, that there was nothing that could have been
received by them. This objection wottld not be available to the
person who has performed labor for hire or sold a capital asset,
since they could not have after those transactions the same things
they had betore them. The normal consequences of those transactions are the acquisition by the worker or vendor of legal
claims of some character. Similarly when a corporation declares
a dividend payable at some future date, the stockholder becomes
a creditor immediately upon declaration of the dividend, and,
therefore, the transformation of the stockholder's interest in the
corporate assets occurs at that moment. The question suggested
by these situations is whether the mere acquisition of those claims,
or the fact that the stockholder becomes such creditor, constitute
the receipt of income. The emphasis in the dividend and reorganization cases was on the acquisition of interests in property
but property in this connection was not defined since the cases did
not call for it. A claim against another, or against property is
in one sense itself property

A taxpayer reporting on an accruals

basis treats income as realized in most situations at the moment
he acquires a receivable, on the other hand, one who reports on
37See E. Seligman, Implications and Effects of the Stock Dividend
Decision, 21 Col. L. Rev. 313.
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the cash receipts and disbursements basis considers income realized only when he comes into possession of the thing to which
the claim entitles him, or some other thing taken in substitution
therefor. The question has usually arisen in cases in which the
issue concerned the tax period in which income was to be reported,
and has been considered rather in connection with the problem
of statutory construction than that of constitutional power The
most decisive factor in answering it is the manner in which the
taxpayer reports his income. The most usual ways of reporting
income are on the basis of accruals or of cash receipts and disbursements, others recognized either by Treasury practice or
statute are the job basis 38 and installment method.3 9 The detailed
discussion of these methods lies beyond the scope of this article,
it is sufficient to state that the first fact to ascertain in any case
which considers the present aspect of the problem of the realization of income is the method on which the taxpayer reports.
A person may come into the possession of property in fruition of a claim thereto even though the tangible fruits of such
claim are never in fact under his separate control. A lessor railroad is deemed to receive rent although the lessee pays the sums
due under the lease directly to the lessor's security holders, the
theory being that the payment to the security holders discharges
a claim due the lessor from the lessee and is thus constructively
received by such lessor.40 The assignment of income does not
prevent the assigned income from being deemed received by the
assignor unless the transaction amounts to the creation of a direct
claim in favor of the assignee against the obligor, in which case
it becomes income to the assignee. 4' The point of present interest
in these assignment cases is not whether and under what circumstands such transaction produces income to the assignor, 42 but
that in those cases in which it is held that it does he is deemed
to receive it although he never has any but a constructive possession thereof. The issue in the above cases was not the tine
3SSee Thomas Cronin Co. v. Lewellyn, (D.C. Pa. 1925) 9 F
(2d) 974.
39See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 44.
40
Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Irwin, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1918) 249

Fed. 726.
41See Hamilton v. Comm. of Int. Rev., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1928) 24
F (2d) 668, Young v. Gnichtel, (D.C. N.J. 1928) 286 F (2d)
Bing42v. Bowers, (D.C. N.Y. 1927) 22 F (2d) 450.

789"

See R. F Magill, The Taxation of Unrealized Income, 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 82.
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income was returnable but the existence of any income to the taxpayer, and hence no point was made of the taxpayer's method of
reporting income. The cases next to be reviewed involved the
time problem. In the normal case the claim that matures by the
claimant coming into possession of its fruits arises either before
or concurrently with those facts that constitute its satisfaction.
In those cases the income is deemed received when the taxpayer
acquires possession of the thing to which the claim entitled him,
if he reports on the cash receipts and disbursements basis.' 3 It
was held in one case that mere acquisition of the legal title was
insufficient, and that the subsequent time when possession was
acquired fixed the year in which it was taxable."4 The circumstances of that case were, however, peculiar, since the assets whose
legal title was acquired were retained by others in connection
with winding up a corporation's business. Attempts have sometunes been made by a taxpayer reporting on the last mentioned
basis to assign income to a period prior to that of the actual
receipt of the thing to which his claim entitled him. The theories
on which such attempts have been based have vaned with the
facts of the particular cases. A receiver who was granted a large
additional compensation at the close of the receivership sought to
sustain ls claim that this sum should be spread over the ),ears
of the receivership by reliance on a court order allocating it over
such period, but the attempt failed. 45 Equitable principles have
been appealed to in vain. 6 The taxpayer who reports on the
cash receipts and disbursements basis cannot treat a claim to
future payment, whatever its basis, as the equivalent of the thing
itself. It has even been suggested that Eisner v. 11acomber prevented including dividends declared in one year but payable in
another as income for the former,' 7 despite the fact that the date
of declaration has been held to fix the time when it becomes a part
of the stockholder's accumulated capital. 48 k taxpayer cannot.
43
Langstaff
44

v. Lucas, (D.C. Ky. 1925) 9 F (2d) 691.
Wells Fargo Bk. & Un. Tr. Co. v. Blair, (D.C. App. 1928) 26
F (2d) 532.
45Jackson v. Smietanka, (D.C. Ill. 1920) 267 Fed. 932, aff'd (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 970.
46Kales v. Woodworth, (D.C. Mich 1927) 20 F (2d) 395; Stieff v. Tait.
(D.C. Md. 1928) 26 F (2d) 489- compare with latter Davidson & Case
Lbr. Co. v. Motter, (D.C. Kan. 1926) 14 F (2d) 137, in which, however,
the taxpayer
reported on an accruals basis.
47

See Kales v. Woodworth, (D.C. Mich. 1927) 20 F (2d) 395:
4STJnited States v. Guinzburg, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1921) 278 Fed. 363.

this does not apply where taxpayer reports on an accruals basis.
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however, postpone the time when he must return income by
voluntarily failing to receive what he is presently entitled to receive
and which is presently available to him. Neither can the government forcibly postpone the actual receipt of income, and then
treat it as taxable in a later year when it permits the taxpayer
actually to receive it. 4 9 The time of actual acquisition of title or
possession, when that was prior to the effective date of the sixteenth amendment, has also been held to prevent income being
treated as received at a later period, although economic analysis
would have required the latter result. Such was the holding that
the value of a building constructed on leased premises, and which
was to belong to the lessor on the expiration of the term, was
received by the lessor at the time of its construction, not at the
expiration of the term, despite the fact that the court recognized that it represented a prepayment of rent distributed over
the whole term. 50 The decision is justified, but not by the reasoning employed. Another court held that the annual amount of
amortization of the premium on bonds issued in 1904 was not
income for various reasons, including that that it was received
before Congress had power to tax such income without apportionment.'
The decision may be justified for the other reasons
assigned despite the fact that the treatment contended for by the
government seems more reasonable under any statute that permits the deduction as interest paid of the entire amounts paid to
the bondholders, particularly as applied to a taxpayer on the
accruals basis, but the above stated reason of the court embodies
too naive and literal a conception of "received." The same remark
applies to the case just before stated.
There are, however, cases in which actual receipt precedes
the transaction that produces the income. When a person comes
into possession of another's property, or acquires the legal title
thereto and possession thereof, by a transaction that is neither
donative, testamentary under the laws of intestate succession,
or in satisfaction of a pre-existing or concurrently arising clain.
there arises a claim in favor of some one against the recipient. It
is clear that such transaction would involve no income for the
recipient at that time. If it is to affect his income in any manner
another transaction will be required. This is what occurs when
49
Forstmann
5

v. Ferguson, (D.C. N.J. 1926) 17 F (2d) 659.
Miller v. Gearin, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1919) 258 Fed. 225.
5'Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Old Colony R. R. Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir.
1928) 26 F (2d) 408.
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the claim against the recipient is cancelled by the person then
entitled thereto, and the logical view would be that the recipient
had received income in the tax period in which that later act
occurred. It is then that his interest in the property received is
transformed if it be still in existence as part of the total property
in his possession or in his ownership and possession, or, if it is
no longer thus existent, that an essential change in interest occurs
in respect of his prior interest in the totality of his property
rights. If now this later transaction is one which, had the transfer of the property occurred concurrently with it, would have
produced income to such recipient, then its subsequent occurrence
in relation to such prior transaction should mark the time when
the larger transaction composed of those two results in the receipt
of income to such recipient. This result has been reached in
at least one case. In Holbrook v. Aoore 2 the president of a corporation had overdrawn his salary prior to March 1, 1913, thereafter in 1913 the directors voted him additional compensation
which was paid by a credit against his overdraft, this cancellation of his liability for the assets in fact received from the corporation before the effective date of the 1913 Act was held to
constitute a receipt of income by. him at the time of such cancellation. The results in Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowcs3 and
Gulf Oil Co. v.Lewellvn) i 4 are contrary to the above case, but the
reasons advanced in support of those decisions are such as prevent them from being considered as instances of the type situation
now being discussed. If accrual to the subsidiary is treated as
equivalent to accrual by the parent corporation because of their
substantial identity, then the parent's possession of the tangible
benefits arising from the maturing of the accrued items would
raise merely a technical legal claim of the subsidiary against the
parent which these cases proceeded to ignore with the result that
the subsequent distribution of a dividend in said amounts by the
subsidiary to the parent would not involve the cancellation of a
real claim, but only of a formal legal one. The same emphasis
on the controlling effect of substance explains a later case in which
withdrawals by two persons who comprised all the stockholders
in a corporation of sums proportionate to their stock holdings
were held to be income for that year rather than for the following year when matters were regularized through the declaration
52
(D.C. Mo. 1921) 293 Fed. 264.
5i(1918) 247 U. S. 330, 38 Sup. Ct. 540. 62 L. Ed. 1142.
54(1918) 248 U. S. 71, 39 Sup. Ct. 35, 63 L. Ed. 133.
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of a dividend for the amounts withdrawn. 55 It thus appears that
the time when a claim, arising out of the actual receipt in possession of another-s property, is cancelled determines the time
when income in the amount of such receipt is received only where
the claim is more than a formal legal one substantially within the
recipient's control. If, however, the cancelled claim arising out
of the kind of transaction now being considered is not merely
a legal one but a real one as well, its cancellation constitutes the
receipt of income and determines the time of such receipt. It
is assumed throughout the foregoing discussion that the cancellation or discharge of the liability was neither donative, testamentary, under the laws of intestate succession, in satisfaction of a
pre-existing or currently arising other claim, or in the nature of
a contribution to capital. It should also be noted that the principle therein considered might have to be modified in application
if the taxpayer reported on an accruals basis. A firm of tax consultants reporting on that basis which had in 1928 received an
overpayment for a job wholly performed in that year would
undoubtedly be sustained in treating the overpayment as 1928
income even though the client had agreed to waive his claim to
have the excess returned in 1929
The discussion in the preceding paragraph dealt with the
effect of the cancellation of claims upon the receipt of income
and the time of its receipt. An analogous problem arises when \ in
accordance with an agreement with B discharges an obligation of B
to C. There is no receipt of income by B from A until a liability
of B to C comes into existence. It has been held that a lessor
railroad received no income for 1918 from the lessee's payment
of the former's 1918 income tax since lessor's liability for such
tax could not have arisen prior to 1919 in which the tax law
applicable to 1918 was passed."
There is no doubt, however
that the lessor would have been held to have received income if
any of its liabilities arising in 1918 had been discharged by the
lessee in 1918, that it would, if on an accruals basis, have been
held to have received income in 1918 even had the lessee discharged any of the lessor's liabilities arising in 1918 during 1919
under an agreement existent during 1918, and that, in the last
situation, it would have been held to have received income in
55
Chatanooga Say. Bk. v. Brewer, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1926) 17 F
(2d) 79.
56
United States v. Norwich & W R. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1926) 16 F
(2d) 944.
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1919 had it been on a cash receipts and disbursements basis.
Another analogous situation is presented by the case of the payment of wages in advance, the workman, if on an accruals basis
can undoubtedly deem that received par passu with those acts
of Ins that discharge his liability to his employer, that is, those
acts that give rise to a claim against such employer which the
latter has paid off in advance, nor is there any doubt but that
the workman would be required to return that payment as of the
time of its actual receipt if he reported on a cash receipts and disbursements basis.
The situation with respect to the legal theory of realization
of income may conveniently be summarized before proceeding to
other problems. Realization, rather than. mere realizability, is a
constitutional condition to the existence of income for a taxpayer. The essential element in realization is the acquisition of
an interest in property in which the taxpayer had no interest
before the transaction from which the income arises, or of an
essentially different interest in the same property after than before
such transaction. The former sometimes reveals itself by the fact
that the taxpayer's wealth is increased by a new asset, sometimes
by a mere substitution of assets, while the latter shows itself
by the fact that that wealth has been affected by a substitution of
one asset for another. This does not mean that proof of these
facts alone establishes that the taxpayer has realized income, the
character of the transaction that resulted in such changes in the
taxpayer's position has also to be considered, and if that is, for
example, a pure capital transaction the emstence of the above facts
will not convert it into an income transaction. A corporation
does not acquire income from the payment to it of the subscription prices of its stock. The requirement above stated does, however, mean that there can be no income for a taxpayer from a
transaction unless it involves the changes in his position indicated
above. Furthermore the complete description of the concept of
realization involves the determination of what constitutes acquisition or receipt. This is frequently equivalent to what shall
be considered as assets m applying the theory that income is realized when a taxpayer acquires a new or different asset in a noncapital transaction. The acquisition of a mere receivable is sufficient if the taxpayer reports on an accruals basis, but not only
not sufficient but not even permitted to be so treated if he reports
on the. cash receipts and disbursements basis. A taxpayer on the
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latter basis is deemed to receive income when he conies into actual
possession of the new or other asset, and will not be allowed to treat
it as income received at any other instant, but cancellation of a
claim against him, the discharge by another of an obligation of
the taxpayer, and the acquisition of actual possession by another
to whom he has directed it be paid, are the legal equivalents of
coming into possession by a taxpayer reporting on said basis, and
have an importance in some connections even for a taxpayer on
the other basis. The decisions establish the first factor in realization on a constitutional basis, theories as to the second are based
almost wholly on cases interpreting the various income tax statutes, and thus afford only indirect indications of what the constitution requires.
The case of Holbrook v M1loore,5 in which the president ot
a corporation was held to have received income when the directors
voted him additional compensation for prior years which was
credited against his overdrafts during such prior years, has already
been discussed. The net effect of the corporation's acts was the
reduction of the president's liabilities in the year in which the
directors voted said additional compensation. The case raises the
question whether the mere reduction of a taxpayer's liabilities constitutes income for him. The answer of the cases is clearly in the
negative. In Alichaels v McLaughlin58 the extinction of a stockholder's contingent liability to pay the balance due the corporatxon on the stock issued him by a direct transfer of that amount
from surplus to capital stock was held to produce no income to
the stockholder. The court treated the transaction as in substance a stock dividend, and its reasons were phrased largely in
terms of the reasoning in Eisner v M1laconmber although the contingent character of the liability received due emphasis. In an
earlier case under the 1909 excise tax act a corporation wlhich
was the sole stockholder of another cancelled its claim against the
latter which had arisen out of advances to it for financing its
capital requirements. It was held that the latter derived no income
since "the cancellation of the debt was a means of contributiton to
its capital account," and income should not "include such wealth
as is honestly appropriated to what would customarily be regarded
as the capital of the corporation taxed."5" The facts of Bowers
57
(D.C.
58
(D.C.
9

Mo. 1921) 293 Fed. 264.
Cal. 1927) 20 F (2d) 959.
" United States v. Ore.-Wash. R. & Nay. Co.. (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1918)
251 Fed. 211.
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v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co. will be stated in full. -k Co. borrowed
money during the period of 1911-1913 on notes repayable in
German marks. The sums so borrowed were loaned by it to B
Co., a subsidiary all of whose stock was owned by it, which used
them to finance the performance of certain construction contracts.
B Co. had lost the sums thus loaned to it during the years 1913,
1914, 1916, 1917 and 1918, and had deducted them in its tax
returns for those years. It does not appear that this meant anything more than that B Co. during those years incurred losses,
but, even if it meant that the specific assets acquired by B Co.
from A Co. when the latter made the loans to the former were
lost during those years, the result should be unaffected since it
seems absurd to transform the problem of determining the existence of income into an investigation of the life history of specific
assets when it is changes in their value aspects alone that are
important. It is only the Court's emphasis on the fact that the
borrowed money was lost that renders the last remarks necessary A Co. repaid the loan in 1921 in marks that were depreci.ated in terms of the dollar. The result was that A Co. had
acquired assets having a value of X dollars when borrowing in
exchange for its promise to pay marks, and that it redeemed that
promise in 1921 by surrendering assets of the value of X-Y dollars. The advantageous payment of its obligation marked the
conclusion of a process whose effect upon it was an increase in
its net assets, that is, in its wealth, which can be assigned to 1921,
even though due to forces spread over other years as well, for the
same reason that gains on the sale of capital assets are treated as
income in the year of sale even though the increase in value
accrued over a period of years. The sole question in the case
should have been the effect on A Co. of the transaction that began
with its borrowing and terminated with the repayment of the loan.
The Court, however, held that A Co. received no income from this
transaction in 1921. Its reason was that the whole transaction
resulted in a loss, presumably to A Co., because the borrowed
money was lost,.and that this loss exceeded the saving incident
to the repayment in depreciated marks. The reasoning is quite
inadequate and inaccurate. There was no proof that A Co. had
as yet lost anything unless loss by its subsidiarv, B Co., be considered as its loss, but. if that view be adopted, reason would
require that the deduction by B Co. of those losses in its tax
60(1926) 271 U. S. 170, 46 Sup. Ct. 449, 70 L. Ed. 886.
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returns be treated as deductions thereof by A Co., in which case
the effect of the present decision would be to permit the same item
to be twice deducted. Furthermore, the statement that the whole
transaction resulted in a loss to A Co. is inaccurate, for the conclusion most favorable to the Court's view that the facts warrant
is a loss to A Co. from wholly distinct transactions. The transaction in question was one between A Co. and the German lenders, the transactions producing the loss were between it and B
Co., or, if losses by B Co. are to be deemed those of A Co., transactions between A Co. and the other parties to the construction
contracts. The logic of the Court's view leads to the conclusion
that, if C makes a profit from the sale of a share of stock which he
invests in a bond that becomes worthless, he cannot be held to
have received income from the former transaction because the
gain was lost in another transaction. There is no indication as
to what the Court would have held had there not been those losses
that play the decisive role in its reasoning, or had they been less
than the saving to A Co. from the payment of its debt in depreciated marks. It has frequently emphasized that income in connection with income tax matters means the same thing as in the
1909 Excise Tax Act. It has been held under that Act that the
write-off of outlawed debts produces income to the debtor for the
year of the write-off."1 That would require treating partial
write-offs, which is in substance the effect of the transaction in
the German mark case, as income except where the purely adventitious factor present in that case, or some other such factor, prevented it. To revert to that case. If its decision is to be either
legally or economically justified, it will have to be on the theory
that the transaction taken as a unit produced a capital receipt to
AkCo. The parties to it certainly did not intend it as such, nothing about it marks it as such, and the Court clearly did not so
treat it. The decision seems unsound, but whatever doubts may
exist on that score do not extend to the reasoning by which the
Court justified its conclusion.
The proper evalution of the legal justification of the decisions
discussed in the preceding paragraph will at least be aided by taking certain economic considerations into account. The necessary
effect of a transaction that decreases a person's liabilities without
a concurrent equivalent reduction of assets is to increase that person's net assets, i.e., his wealth. That is true whether the decrease
G1Great North. Ry. Co. v. Lynch, (D.C. Minn. 1921) 292 Fed. 903.
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results from the total or partial cancellation of a claim by the
creditor, from the discharge of the claim by some one other than
the creditor,6 2 or from the payment of a debt with assets of
lesser money value than those promised when the debt was
incurred. The interest of the debtor in his assets prior to such
transaction included the element of their liability to be applied
to satisfy that debt, transactions of the above character produce
changes m his interest in his assets so that it is perfectly reasonable to treat it as the acquisition of a different interest in the same
assets. The legal theory requires the new interest to be essentially different; the resulting difference is essentially different from
the point of view of economic analysis since what has happened is
a redistribution of economic claims to those assets involving an
increase m the-debtor's claims thereto. It is difficult to see why
this is not an adequate basis on which to predicate the legal conclusion, "essential difference," which the legal theory requires. In
the light of this analysis the decisions in the cases discussed in
the preceding paragraph, with the exception of that in Holbrook
v. Moore, seem clearly wrong, unless something in the nature of
the acts that produced the increase in the debtor's net assets justifies them. Cancellation of a debt, or discharging another's debt
to a third person, may constitute gifts or bequests and therefore
not taxable under the tax acts, such was not the situation in the
cases in question. Such acts may constitute ways of making capital contributions, in this case by the party cancelling or discharging
the claim to the capital of the debtor. Normally one person does
not make a contribution to the capital of another unless the latter
assumes some kind of liability to the former in respect thereto.
When a stockholder contributes to the corporate capital this liability, though legally existent, is formal rather than substantial
from an economic point of view The cancellation by the sole
stockholder of a debt incurred by the corporation to the stockholder amounts in substance to such stockholder locking up the
amount of such debt in the enterprise which is in an economic
sense his own, and is reasonably construed as a capital transaction, hence the decision in United States v. Oregon-Washington
River & Navigatzon. Co.13 is justified even though some of its
62
Where the person discharging the claim does so because obligated by agreement with the debtor, there occurs a concurrent equivalent reduction of the debtor's assets; cases are, however, conceivable in
which
63 no such diminution occurs.
(C.C.A 2d Cir. 1918) 251 Fed. 211.
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reasoning is taulty The extinction ot a stockholder's liability
for the unpaid subscription price of his stock by a transfer from
surplus to capital stock is essentially the panient of a dividend
from surplus and its use to pay off the debt. The former is as
clearly an income transaction as the latter is a capital one. The
decision in Michaels v. McLaughli, 6 4 thus appears to make form
rather than substance the controlling factor. The increase in
the debtor's net assets in the German mark case was certainly not
due to a gift or to a capital transaction, the decision in that case is
clearly wrong. The result of the various decisions involving the
effects upon income of transactions that decrease a person's liabilities without an equivalent diminution in his assets is that they
give rise to income unless the result of a gift, bequest, or capital
transaction, but in no case do they involve income if the assets
acquired in exchange for the liability in question have been
diminished by losses equal to or in excess of the increase in net
assets resulting from the cancellation, discharge, or advantageous
payment of the liability The qualification is clearly unsound.
although it may afford a method for taking care at least in part
of such cases as compositions with creditors, discharges in bankruptcy, and the voluntary scaling down of claims incident to
receiverships and reorganizations. These might be equally well
taken care of if treated as gifts of capital, which is what they
are as far as their essential economic character is concerned. It
should at least be pointed out that the implications of said qualications produce some strange results in so far as it takes no account
of the prior treatment of such losses for income tax purposes.
If, for example, a manufacturer should buy raw materials on
credit for X dollars, he will set them up on his books at that figure. They will, when completely used up, have entered the cost
of goods sold on that basis. If the debt for them is later discharged for X-Y dollars, his cost of goods sold will have been
overstated, and to that extent will his profits have been understated with a consequent underpayment of his taxes. The like
result would follow if, as seems likely, losses in respect of the
assets thus acquired will have been computed on the basis of a
cost of X dollars. The theory of the government in the German
mark case would have prevented this result by increasing income
by an offsetting gain either in the same or some later tax period.
It is interesting to speculate on what the Court would do if the
64(D.C. Cal. 1927) 20 F (2d) 959.
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government should require the taxpayer to file amended returnb
to correct the overstatement of cost of goods sold or of losses in
the situations just presented. The same question might be asked
as to the case of an insolvent who effects a composition with creditors, and a bankrupt whose estate pays less than the full value
of the claims against him.
Legal theory and economics agree on distinguishing income
from capital. Such statements as that the former is a flow while
the latter is an accumulated or accumulating fund are correct
enough but afford rather a starting point for further analysis than
an immediate basis for the solution of concrete problems. The
same applies to the figurative language of the Court in Eimser v.
Macomber that capital is the tree, income its fruit. The constitution prohibits the taxation of capital as such without apportionment among the states on the population basis. Hence the necessity of drawing the line between capital and income. The starting
point is the fact that the concept of capital refers to the state of
a person's wealth at a given instant of time whereas income denotes changes therein occurring within a given period of time.
It follows that the receipt of something during a given period
would not be income for that period if it gave the recipient nothing that was not already his at the beginning of said period. It
thus becomes necessary to fix upon some instant of time as the
point from which to measure the effects of subsequent transactions upon a person's wealth in order to determine whether or not
the transactions involve income for him. The most important
instant of time in connection with the income tax is the date on
which the sixteenth amendment became a part of the Constitution, which was February 3, 1913. The statutes have, however.
for purposes of convemence adopted March 1, 1913, as the significant date. The receipt by a stockholder of a liquidating dividend in 1914 in an amount not in excess of the value of his
interest at March 1, 1913, was held to produce no income to him.6 '
Various reasons were assigned. It was stated that the transaction
involved a mere change in the form of his property which produced no income because its value was the same before as after
the change. This reasoning is clearly inadequate since it would
prevent treating income as ever derived from a liquidating divi-dend, the gains on such a conversion of the stockholder's capital
65
Lynch v. Turrish, (1918) 247 U. S. 221. 38 Sup. Ct. 537 62 L.
Ed. 1087
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interest have, however, been held taxable.06 It is also madequate
insofar as it requires gain from the particular transaction since
that is inconsistent with Lynch v. Hornby, 7 and would prevent
the taxation of realized capital gains. The substance of its other
reason is that, since the gain realized by the conversion accrued
prior to the effective date of the tax law, it had become capital at
that date in an amount equal to that received on liquidation, and
that, therefore, it involved a mere receipt of capital without an element of gain. It is patent that the surplus adhering to a share at
such date should be equally capital if later distributed as an ordinary dividend. It is not the character of the act by which the stockholder later realizes his interest, but its status as an element in
his wealth at a given date, that should determine whether it is
capital or something else at such date. Nevertheless it was held
in Lynch v Hornby, already cited, that a distribution from such
pre-March 1, 1913, surplus by way of an ordinary dividend constituted income to the stockholder. Nor can these two cases be
reconciled by invoking the definition of realization of income later
developed in Eisner v. Macomber, that definition states merely
that certain conditions must exist if a transaction is to produce
income, not that every transaction in which they exist has that
result. Furthermore thev were equallv existent in Lvnch v Turrish as in Lynch v. Hornby.
There are, therefore, some situations in which the mere conversion without gain after March 1, 1913, of what was part of
the recipient's capital fund at said date produces income to him,
and others in which it does not. The majority of the situations
are treated under the second category The capital fund may be
a mere legal claim as well as an interest of some sort in particular
physical assets or in an enterprise, in fact refined legal analysis
might well reduce the latter to types of legal claims. It has been
held that dividends declared prior to March 1, 1913, though payable thereafter, and interest due on said date for the period ending on February 28, 1913, were capital at March 1, 1913, so as
not to be includible in income for the period when actually paid.0 8
If the claim is in the form of a binding promise to make a series
66Langstaff v. Lucas, (D.C. Ky 1925) 9 F (2d) 691.
67(1918) 247 U. S. 339, 38 Sup. Ct. 543, 62 L. Ed. 1149.
6SAs to former, see United States v. Guinzburg, 278 Fed. 363 (1921)
in which the government sought to tax the whole amount received
rather than the excess thereof over its March 1, 1913, value. As to
latter, see Plant v. Walsh, (D.C. Conn. 1922) 280 Fed. 722.

CONCEPT OF INCOME IN FEDERAL TAXATION

667

of fixed payments over a period of years, the courts have correctly computed the capital value which the promisee is entitled
to receive without tax at the discounted March 1, 1913, value of
such payments, and their reasoning on that matter has followed
approved economic analysis. 69 If, however, the future payments
depend on contingencies that may result in their never being
receivable, their capitalization at their March 1, 1913, value is not
permitted. Commissions due insurance agents on renewal premiums furmsh a case in point.70 If future payment of some amount
is reasonably certain at March 1, 1913, but the exact amount is
contingent, capitalization has been allowed on the basis that the
future payment equalled the amount which on March 1, 1913, was
reasonably certain to be paid.7 It would seem that the contingency present m the renewal commissions cases above referred to
might well be resolved by applying some factor of probability statistically determined so as to bring these cases within the principle
of the case last cited, since the contingency in substance affected
the amount of future commissions. In a few cases the courts
*have treated the whole amount received after March 1, 1913, on
a clani owned. at that date as non-taxable, but whether they would
have so held had this aspect of the problem been called to their
attention cannot be determined.7 - The general rule is, therefore,
that the wealth owned by a taxpayer at March 1, 1913, is deemed
capital for income tax purposes and that its conversion after said
date is tax free to the extent of its value at said date. Transactions within the principles of Lymxh v. Horizby constitute a clear
exception. It is the only one of the cases that discussed the constitutional issue, but it would seem equally clear from the basis
of Lynch v. Ttrrzsh that Congress could not have treated the
stockholder's receipts therein as income. Attention should be
directed to one extension of this doctrine. The decisions in Good8
rch v. Edwards"
and Walsh v. Brewster7l protect not only the
taxpayer's capital at March 1, 1913, but that value plus decreases
69Flatt v. Bowers, (D.C. N.Y. 1926) 13 F (2d) 951, Ruth Iron Co.
v. Comm'r
of Int. Rev., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 26 F (2d) 30.
70
Edwards v. Keith, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1916) 231 Fed. 110; Woods
v. Lewellvn, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1918) 252 Fed. 106. See also J. M. Maguire,
Income Taxes on the Realization of Future Interests, 31 Yale L.
Jour.71367.
72Lucas v. Alexander, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1928) 27 F (2d) 237
Umted States v. Guinzburg, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1921) 278 Fed. 363;
Saunders v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1928) 29 F (2d) 834.
73(1921) 255 U. S. 527, 41 Sup. Ct. 390, 65 L. Ed. 758.
74(1921) 255 U. S. 536, 41 Sup. Ct. 392, 65 L. Ed. 762.
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therein occurring between the date the asset was acquired and
March 1, 1913, at least so far as these are later disposed of by
direct sale of the asset itself. If these cases be construed as indicating the limits of Congress' power, and there is some basis for
such view, then the date of acquisition of an asset, if prior to
March 1, 1913, becomes one of the significant dates in determining what comprises a taxpayer's capital for tax purposes.
The situation in regard to property acquired after March 1,
1913, offers little difficulty It becomes a part of the taxpayer's
capital when acquired even though acquired by a transaction that
involved realizing income by such taxpayer, that is, realized
income adds to the taxpayer's capital the amount realized. The
mere conversion of capital without a realization of a gain by substituting one asset for another has no effect upon a person's capital, and the tax laws take no account of it. There are, however,
some transactions that increase a person's net capital that do not
under the law involve any acquisition of income by him. Some
of these rest on express statutory provisions such as property
.acquired by gift, devise or bequest, others are based on the theory
that they represent capital as distinguished from income transactions. In the cases discussed in the preceding paragraph acquisitions of property were held to be capital transactions because
they involved merely conversions of what was the taxpayer's
capital at some earlier date, in the case next to be considered the
property acquired involved no such conversion of prior capital,
but represented the acquisition of new and additional assets with
no corresponding increase in liabilities of any character, at least
if the Court's theory of the case be adopted. The facts of the
case7 were that the Cuban government had during the period
from 1911 to 1916 granted an American corporation certain subsidies in land and money under contracts requiring it to construct
and operate a railroad, and to perform certain transportation services for the government and in respect of certain other services
at specified rates. The subsidies were carried in a suspense
account until 1916 when they were transferred to surplus. The
tax authorities treated these cash receipts as prepayments for services and includible in income for the years when received, the land
subsidy was not thus included. The Court denied that they were
either such prepayments or gifts, but constituted capital contribu75

Edwards v. Cuba R. R., (1925)
69 L. Ed. 1124

268 U S. 628, 45 Sup. Ct. 614,
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tions to promote public interests and to be used for completing
the road's construction. The reasons assigned were that they were
intended to reimburse the company for its capital outlay, and that
nothing indicated that they were to be used for dividends, interest or anything else properly chargeable against earnings. It
may be quite true that the payments were intended to reimburse
the company for its capital outlay, but the fact remains that at the
close of the transaction the company still owned that capital and
had the subsidy in addition. Presumably the company would in
future years charge rates sufficient to take care through depreciation charges to be again reimbursed for its capital so far as
others used it, and that its own net income for tax and other purposes would reflect those facts. The result would be that it would
be allowed to convert tax free an amount of capital in excess
of that contributed by itself, that is, in excess of the cost to it
of that capital or of the March 1, 1913, value of its own capital
contribution. This result, which amounts to a double reimbursement for its capital outlay, would have been avoided by treating
the subsidies as income either in the years of their receipt or in
some or all of the years of future operation. The only other way
to avoid it would be to restrict future depreciation charges so as
to prevent the recovery through rates of more than the cost or
value of its own capital contribution. As to the argument that
nothing indicated that they were to be used for dividends, interest
or other charges against earmngs, it is sufficient to state that the
very fact that they were carried to surplus makes them available
for dividends at once, and that the character of the disbursements
to which assets may be applied is scarcely a test of the capital
or income character of the transaction by which those assets were
obtained. The further argument that they represented no gains
from the use or operation of the road does not tend to prove the
Court's conclusion unless income is restricted to receipts of that
character, which is the whole point in issue. The case raises the
whole problem of what constitutes a capital receipt. The substitution of one asset for another without gain is clearly such,
so is the acquisition of additional assets so far as offset by a concurrent equivalent increase in liabilities. The crucial case is that
in which additional assets are acquired with no change in liabilities. Here there is an increase in net assets uactually realized,
an actual net accretion to a person's economic power, a flow to
him of goods equal to the whole value of the additional asset.
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This would seem to be as clearly income as is the realization of
capital gains which has been held to be such." The fundamental
fallacy that underlies the reasoning in Edwards v Cuba R. R. Co.,
is that the character of a receipt is made to depend on its disposition rather than on the nature of the transaction in which received.
as if the use of corporate net earnings to increase fixed plant
could alter the income character of the transactions producing the
net earnings. The decision would be explicable had the Court
adopted the view that it was a gift and thus not taxable under
the statute, at least as concerns the subsidies received after March
1, 1913, or if treated as involving the concurrent assumption of
a liability to perform its promises contained in the subsidy contract which was not evaluated in terms of money because of difficulties in that process, although this would be substantially
equivalent to treating the subsidies as prepayments for future
services.
The logic of the position that the acquisition of additional
assets with no increase in liabilities due thereto produces income
leads to the conclusion that gifts, bequests and devises are income
to the recipient, however much they may from the general social
point of view represent mere redistributions of capital..
1-,.
legal concept of income is an individual income concept, the latter consideration would be immaterial. The tax law in fact excludes such acquisitions. Whether their specific exclusion indicates a legislative view that they would otherwise be includible
in income is not the point of present interest, that point is whether
they could be so included. If a gift is a capital transaction of the
same order as the subsidies in Edwards v Cuba R. R. Co., then
the capital received thereby is the value of the asset at the time
it is received. If so, then the sale of that asset at a price equal
to that value would involve a conversion of capital without gain,
and a sale for more than such value would involve conversion at
a gain equal to the difference between the selling price and the
capital value at the time of its receipt. It has already been shown
that the capital value of an asset at March 1, 1913, is permitted
to be recovered tax free on the subsequent sale of that asset, and
that the principle on which that holding was based has its roots in
constitutional theory The capital value at the date a gift is
received is not required to be thus protected. To compute the
70
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gain on its sale by a formula that treats as part of the donee's
income a part of that capital value has been held not to involve
a tax on capital but on income which need not conform to the
apportionment rule. 77 The theory that it involved a direct tax on
capital is forcibly argued in the dissenting opinion in the case
while in the circuit court of appeals.78 That is clearly its economic
effect if a gift of property, as distinct from a gift of future income
therefrom, is a capital transaction. If, however, the original gift
of the corpus be itself income, then the existing rule for measuring the gain on the sale of property acquired by gift after December 31, 1920, whose validity was in question in Taft v. Bowers,
takes on a quite different aspect. Its effect is then to tax at the
time of sale the realized gain accrued during the donee's ownership, and to impose a deferred tax on a part of the income acquired
by the donee at the time of the gift. To determine whether tlus
theory accords with the Court's requires a statement of the
reasomng in Taft v. Bowers. The principal point in it is that
there had been but a single investment in the property sold by the
donee, the investment by the donor. The donor held this investment subject to a liability to be taxed on the gain from its sale
if he sold it, and the donee acquired it subject to that liability,
that is, the liability to be taxed on its sale by him on the theory
that it was being sold by the donor. To compute the tax on
that basis thus constitutes the mere discharge by the donee of an
obligation to the government voluntarily assumed at the time he
acquired the gift, an approach to the problem of income that
has possibilities limited only by judicial self-limitation. A situation is conceivable in which the negative value of that liability
would reduce the capital value of the gift at the time of its
receipt to the loss and gain basis the property would have if disposed of by the donor, but it is one that would seldom exist and
which did not exist in Taft v. Bowers. That reasoning does not,
therefore, dispose of the view that the rule of that case involves
the taxation of capital if a gift of a corpus is a capital as distinct
from an income transaction. The Court further affirms that
nothing in the constitution requires income from capital gains
to be restricted to gains occurring while the taxpayer owned the
property. It is certain that the Court would so restrict it had
it been acquired by purchase, which tends to the view that in
77
Taft
8

v. Bowers, (1929) 49 Sup. Ct. 199.

7 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1927) 20 F (2d) 561.
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the case of property other than that owned at March 1, 1913,
the capital value protected against being treated as income ol the
conversion of assets is investment. 79 If so, the whole selling
price on the sale of property acquired by gift could be taxed,
if so, then it is difficult to see why the gift could not be treated
as income when received. There is no logical basis for holding
that the investment which is protected in the manner above described is that of some person other than the one making the
investment, especially since the constitution clearly permits the
adoption of the individual income concept. It must, however,
be admitted that the reasoning in Taft v Bowers throws no
light on what the Court would hold if gifts were sought to be
taxed as income, or if their whole selling price were sought to
be treated as gain, assuming in each case a gift made after
March 1, 1913.80
Gifts of the corpus of property are legally distinguished from
gifts of income from the corpus. A gift of the latter as income
has been held taxable. 8' If the gift is one of future income, or
of a series of future incomes, it would of course be possible
to capitalize it. The question then arises whether such capitalized
value is such capital as is protected against taxation on its conversion, that is, on receipt of the periodical income payments.
The question would arise, as it has, in determining the recipient's
right to deduct from each annual payment the diminution in the
capital value due to the lapse of time. That such diminution
occurs is an economic fact, and will remain so as long as interest
exists. The right to such deduction has been disallowed on the
score that there was no diminution by use in the value of the
property producing the income, and that to permit it would
encourage subterfuges to defeat the tax.82 The former reason
is inadequate for it overlooks the fact that the interest of the
79
That the various tax acts are construed to protect that, see
Warner v. Walsh, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1926) 15 F (2d) 367; United States
v. Bolster, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1928) 26 F (2d) 760; Allen v. Brandeis,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 29 F (2d) 363
8OAnother situation raising the problem of the extent of the protec
tion accorded capital value against being treated as income on the
conversion of that capital is that in which a person sells property
bought at a forced sale at a figure below its actual value at the time
of its81 purchase.
Irwin v. Gavit, (1925) 268 U. S. 161, 45 Sup. Ct. 475, 69 L. Ed.
897 see for discussion of this type of problem, J. M. Maguire, Capitaliof Periodical Payments by Gift, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 20.
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person entitled to the income is itself a distinct thing. The rule
of that case has received, and now has, statutory sanction. If the
clam- to those future payments had been purchased, the investment would be recoverable without being treated as income either
by treating no receipt as income till the whole investment had
been recovered, 3 or by treating a part of each payment as a
return of capital. Here again it is the investment, rather than
the economic capitalized value of gratuitous income payments,
that receives protection. The capitalized value of those gifts of
future income is in the economic sense those gifts themselves at
the time the right therein is conferred. If that value need not be
accorded freedom from taxes when periodically converted, there
would seem to be no economic or legal reason why the gift
of the corpus of property should be constitutionally incapable of
being deemed income. It cannot be safely predicted that this
would be the decision if the case were squarely raised.
The preceding discussion has aimed to set forth the elements
in the concept of income that has been developed by the courts
in dealing with income tax questions. It has been possible in
some respects to indicate the constitutionally requisite elements,
in others merely those developed in the process of statutory interpretation. It is probably, although not absolutely, correct to
treat the latter as indicating elements that lie within the limits
of the constitutionally permissible, but, since the statutes may
have failed to include the whole field of permissible income,
decisions excluding certain items from income on the basis of
statutory construction cannot be taken as defining what cannot be
income under the sixteenth amendment. A summary of the discussion, to be useful, would have to be too extended, and will, therefore, be omitted. The aim has been to outline the concept, indicate
elements of inconsistency in it that come to the surface in various
decisions and in the reasoning by which they are supported, and
develop the implications of various of the judicial theories of
income and capital. Emphasis has centered on that part of the
reasoning in which the courts themselves have invoked economic
considerations, and which might, therefore, fairly be subjected
to an economic critique. Arguments such as that in United States
v. Phellis that a stockholder receiving a dividend for which lie has
paid in his purchase price may be taxed when he receives that
dividend because he steps into his predecessor's shoes, the some83

See cases in footnote 79.
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what similar argument in Taft v Bowers, and that justifying
certain rules because of their tendency to prevent tax evasion,
have sometimes been stated, seldom extensively discussed, and
even more rarely evaluated. The same is true of arguments based
on the assumption that the courts were discovering the meaning
of income as commonly understood, which finds its extreme formulation in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holnes in the
Stock Dividend Case. The subordination of that kind of argument
and type of consideration was not based on any theory that they
were irrelevant, but rather that their use involves such broad
reliance on almost immeasurable factors that enter into judicial
discretion as to make their evaluation an extremely uncertain
process. It is the creative judicial process in developing the
concept of income for income tax purposes as that was influenced
by economic considerations that has furnished the theme for this
discussion. The courts have acted wisely in taking them into
account and in giving them the weight they have received, too
wide a departure therefrom might entail more injustice than it
8 4
would eliminate.
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